The Politics of Intellectual Self-trust
The Politics of Intellectual Self-trust
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DOI：
10.1080/02691728.2011.652215
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发表时间：
2012-01-01
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Jones, Karen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jones, Karen
正如证词会受到不公正的社会关系的影响一样，智力上的自信也会受到影响。我为智力自信辩护，解释了为什么它被正确地认为是信任，为什么它是针对自我的，并探讨了它与社会权力的关系。智力上的自信既不是倾向于依赖一个人的认识方法和机制，也不是有一套关于哪些是可靠的信念。相反，它是一个代理人对自己的认知方法和机制采取的立场，包括认知和情感元素。我们的智力自信是社会创造和维持的，因此容易受到社会力量的影响。不公正的社会关系导致认识上的不公正，这破坏了弱势群体的自我信任;不公正的社会关系导致特权群体过度的自我信任，这延续了认识上的不公正，这进一步破坏了弱势群体的自我信任，形成恶性反馈循环。最后，我将探讨如何更好地校准被社会扭曲的智力自信。
Just as testimony is affected by unjust social relations, so too is intellectual self-trust. I defend an account of intellectual self-trust that explains both why it is properly thought of as trust and why it is directed at the self, and explore its relationship to social power. Intellectual self-trust is neither a matter of having dispositions to rely on one's epistemic methods and mechanisms, nor having a set of beliefs about which ones are reliable. Instead, it is a stance that an agent takes towards her own cognitive methods and mechanisms, comprising both cognitive and affective elements. Our intellectual self-trust is created and sustained socially and is thus porous to social power. Unjust social relations cause epistemic injustice, which undermines self-trust among the underprivileged; unjust social relations cause excessive self-trust among the privileged, which perpetuates epistemic injustice, which further undermines the self-trust of the disadvantaged in a vicious feedback loop. I conclude by exploring ways in which socially distorted intellectual self-trust can become better calibrated.