THE PURE THEORY OF LARGE 2-CANDIDATE ELECTIONS
THE PURE THEORY OF LARGE 2-CANDIDATE ELECTIONS
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DOI:
10.1007/bf00124816
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发表时间:
1984-01-01
期刊:
影响因子:
1.6
通讯作者:
LEDYARD, JO
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
LEDYARD, JO
A long-standing goal of political theorists has been the development of a coherent, consistent, and nonvacuous theory of elections, particularly of those using majority rule. If possible, such a theory is to be based on rational individual and group behavior. In spite of extensive effort, recent writings (see, for example, Ordeshook and Shepsle, 1982) reveal that many may now be prepared to give up this research program on the grounds that no such model exists. There appear to be two main stumbling blocks to a consistent theory based on the rational behavior of participants:(1) the theoretical proposition that, given any realistic assumption about the cost of voting, rational voters will not participate in elections, and (2) even if they vote, majority-rule equilibria rarely exist. The First result is obviously contradicted by* Northwestern University. The research for this paper has been supported by NSF grant SES8106896 which is gratefully acknowledged. The paper itself was prepared for presentation at the Conference on Political Economy at Carnegie-Mellon University in June 1983. Without that incentive it might still be unwritten. I have had the help and advice of many people--some of whom disagree with the conclusions. Among these were the participants in workshops at Cal Tech, lowa, Tulane, Indiana, Stanford, and Northwestern University. The exacting standards of Howard Rosenthal are responsible for much of whatever quality in presentation exists. I thank him for this help and advice. Peter Coughlin found early lapses. An early version was presented at the Public Choice Society meetings, as my presidential address, in 1981.