A Contract-Auction Mechanism for Multi-Relay Cooperative Wireless Networks

A Contract-Auction Mechanism for Multi-Relay Cooperative Wireless Networks
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DOI:
10.1109/vtcspring.2014.7022771
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发表时间:
2014-05
期刊:
2014 IEEE 79th Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC Spring)
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Bahareh Nazari;A. Jamalipour
Bahareh Nazari;A. Jamalipour
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
Bahareh Nazari;A. Jamalipour

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无线系统的合作需要提供适当的激励措施。此外,中继节点可能不愿意向其他节点透露自己的信道状态信息,这将导致信息的不对称。本文将契约理论与拍卖机制相结合,激励中继节点合作,实现源节点和中继节点的效用最大化。在信息不对称的情况下,提出了一种考虑节点个体功率约束的电力分配和电价分配算法。提出的解决方案是分布式的,易于实现,信令开销可以忽略不计。仿真结果量化了该算法的性能。
Cooperation in wireless systems requires providing proper incentives. Furthermore, relay nodes may not be willing to reveal their channel state information to others, which will result in asymmetry of information. This paper integrates contract theory and auction mechanism to stimulate relays to cooperate and maximize utility of both the source node and the relay node. In the presence of asymmetric information, a novel power allocation and price assignment algorithm is proposed which takes into account the individual power constraint of nodes. The proposed solution is distributed and easy to implement with negligible signaling overhead. Simulation results are presented to quantify the performance of the proposed algorithm.