Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem
Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem
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扩展泊松博弈和孔多塞陪审团定理
DOI：
10.1006/game.1997.0610
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发表时间：
1998
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
R. Myerson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Myerson
扩展了种群不确定性博弈的泊松模型，允许期望的种群规模和局中人效用函数依赖于未知的世界状态。这样的扩展泊松游戏证明了一个推广的孔多塞陪审团定理。
The Poisson model of games with population uncertainty is extended, by allowing that expected population sizes and players' utility functions may depend on an unknown state of the world. Such extended Poisson games are applied to prove a generalization of the Condorcet jury theorem.