Why aren’t we all hutterites?
Why aren’t we all hutterites?
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为什么我们不都是哈特人？
DOI：
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发表时间：
2003
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
R. Sosis
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文献类型：
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作者：
R. Sosis
在本文中，我探讨了仪式表演的心理学，并提出了一个简单的图形模型，澄清了威廉·艾恩斯的宗教理论中的几个问题，宗教是一种“难以伪造”的承诺标志。艾恩斯认为，宗教行为或仪式是个人对宗教团体承诺的昂贵信号。宗教团体成员之间增加的承诺可能促进团体内的合作，这被认为是宗教的主要适应性利益。在这里，我对个人如何能够支付仪式表演的短期成本来获得宗教团体提供的长期健身益处提出了一个近似的解释。该模型解决了艾恩斯理论提出的三个重要问题。首先，该模型解释了为什么潜在的搭便车者即使在宗教团体成员可以获得显著的净利益时也不加入宗教团体。其次，该模式阐明了为了实现稳定和防止潜在的搭便车者加入宗教团体，一个仪式必须付出多大的代价。第三，该模型说明了为什么宗教团体可能会要求信徒执行其他人不遵守的私人仪式。本文还讨论了由模型产生的几个假设。
In this paper I explore the psychology of ritual performance and present a simple graphical model that clarifies several issues in William Irons’s theory of religion as a “hard-to-fake” sign of commitment. Irons posits that religious behaviors or rituals serve as costly signals of an individual’s commitment to a religious group. Increased commitment among members of a religious group may facilitate intra-group cooperation, which is argued to be the primary adaptive benefit of religion. Here I propose a proximate explanation for how individuals are able to pay the short-term costs of ritual performance to achieve the long-term fitness benefits offered by religious groups. The model addresses three significant problems raised by Irons’s theory. First, the model explains why potential free-riders do not join religious groups even when there are significant net benefits that members of religious groups can achieve. Second, the model clarifies how costly a ritual must be to achieve stability and prevent potential free-riders from joining the religious group. Third, the model suggests why religious groups may require adherents to perform private rituals that are not observed by others. Several hypotheses generated from the model are also discussed.