Price and Quantity Contracts in a Mixed Duopoly with a Socially Concerned Firm: Price and Quantity Contracts in Mixed Duopoly
Price and Quantity Contracts in a Mixed Duopoly with a Socially Concerned Firm: Price and Quantity Contracts in Mixed Duopoly
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与社会关注公司的混合双头垄断中的价格和数量合同：混合双头垄断中的价格和数量合同
DOI：
10.1002/mde.2707
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发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
M. Kopel
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Kopel
我研究的内生选择的价格或数量合同在一个混合双寡头与社会关注的公司，最大化的利润和消费者福利的组合。价格契约和数量契约的均衡可能共存;价格竞争下的福利可能低于数量竞争下的福利;企业的利润排名可能不同于私人双寡头垄断或混合双寡头垄断与公共企业。因此，如果一个公司遵循社会战略，最优的市场战略关键取决于社会关注和市场竞争的水平。关心社会的公司的存在可能会改变竞争模式。版权所有© 2014约翰威利父子有限公司.
I study the endogenous choice of a price or quantity contract in a mixed duopoly with a socially concerned firm, which maximizes a combination of profit and consumer welfare. Equilibria with price and quantity contracts might co‐exist; welfare under price competition might be lower than under quantity competition; the firms' profit ranking might be different from that of a private duopoly or mixed duopoly with a public firm. Hence, if a firm follows a social strategy, the optimal market strategy crucially depends on the levels of social concern and competition in the market. The presence of socially concerned firms may change the mode of competition. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.