Towards a Unified Decision Theory: A Non-Bayesian Approach
Towards a Unified Decision Theory: A Non-Bayesian Approach
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迈向统一决策理论：非贝叶斯方法
DOI：
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发表时间：
1977
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Watkins
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Watkins
约翰·海萨尼（John Harsanyi，1977）在他的《理解理性行为的进展》（Advances in Understanding Rational Behavior）一书中提出并回答了一些非常有趣的问题。我将主要关注的问题是统一决策理论问题。(He他更喜欢“效用理论”这个术语，因为它是一种涵盖了在确定性、风险和不确定性条件下的理性决策的一般理论。在开始讨论这个问题之前，我先对他提出的另一个问题提出一个简短的建议：理性的规范观念如何在经济学这样的实证科学中发挥核心作用？
In his ‘Advances in Understanding Rational Behavior’ John Harsanyi (1977) raises, and answers, some very interesting problems. The one with which I will be mainly concerned is the problem of unifyingdecision theory. (He prefers the term ‘utility theory’ for a general theory that covers rational decision making under conditions of certainty, risk, and uncertainty.) Before turning to that I will make one quick suggestion concerning another problem that he raises: how can the normativeidea of rationality play a central role in a positivescience such as economics?