Queueing Problems with Two Parallel Servers
Queueing Problems with Two Parallel Servers
复制标题
两个并行服务器的排队问题
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.970807
复制
发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Eun Jeong Heo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Y. Chun;Eun Jeong Heo
一群特工正在设施中等待他们的工作被处理。我们假设每个代理需要相同的处理时间并产生等待成本。该设施有两台并行服务器，能够同时为两个代理提供服务。我们感兴趣的是找到为代理商服务的订单以及他们应该得到的(积极或消极的)金钱补偿。我们引入了两个规则，最小转移规则和最大转移规则。我们证明了这两个规则对应于具有两个服务台的排队对策的Shapley(1953)值，就像Maniquet(2003)和Chun(2006a)对于一个服务的排队问题所讨论的那样，当每个联盟的值被适当地定义时。如果联盟的价值是通过假设联盟成员在非联盟成员之前被服务来定义的，那么就得到了最小转移规则。另一方面，如果通过假设联盟成员在非联盟成员之后服务来定义最大转移规则，则得到最大转移规则。
A group of agents are waiting for their job to be processed in a facility. We assume that each agent needs the same amount of processing time and incurs waiting costs. The facility has two parallel servers, being able to serve two agents at a time. We are interested in finding the order to serve agents and the (positive or negative) monetary compensations they should receive. We introduce two rules for the problem, the minimal transfer rule and the maximal transfer rule. We show that these two rules correspond to the Shapley (1953) value of the queueing games with two servers, as discussed similarly by Maniquet (2003) and Chun (2006a) for queueing problems with one serve, when the worth of each coalition is appropriately defined. If the worth of a coalition is defined by assuming the coalitional members are served before the non-coalitional members, then the minimal transfer rule is obtained. On the other hand, if it is defined by assuming the coalitional members are served after the non-coalitional members, then the maximal transfer rule is obtained.
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2007
期刊：
Seoul Journa! Of Economics 20
影响因子：
--
作者：
Youngsub Chun;Toru Hokari
通讯作者：
Toru Hokari