The virtues (and vices) of the four principles
The virtues (and vices) of the four principles
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DOI：
10.1136/jme.29.5.292
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发表时间：
2003-10-01
影响因子：
4.1
通讯作者：
Campbell, AV
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Campbell, AV
尽管在道德理论中有争夺主要地位的倾向，但美德伦理学和四原则方法都不应声称高于或逻辑上高于另一种方法。合在一起，它们对道德生活的描述比任何一种本身所能提供的都要充分。原则主义的优点是清晰、简单，而且(在某种程度上)具有普遍性。拉南·吉隆对他所提供的案例的巧妙分析很好地说明了这一点。但这种方法的缺点与其优点相反：忽视情感和个人因素，将问题过于简单化，过度主张普遍性。美德伦理学提供了一种补充方法，提供了对道德品格的洞察，提供了理性和情感的混合，并注意了决策的背景。如果我们将各种方法结合起来，就可以更充分地理解所提供的案例。两者都应该培养谦逊和宽宏大量的美德。
Despite tendencies to compete for a prime place in moral theory, neither virtue ethics nor the four principles approach should claim to be superior to, or logically prior to, the other. Together they provide a more adequate account of the moral life than either can offer on its own. The virtues of principlism are clarity, simplicity and (to some extent) universality. These are well illustrated by Ranaan Gillon's masterly analysis of the cases he has provided. But the vices of this approach are the converse of its virtues: neglect of emotional and personal factors, oversimplification of the issues, and excessive claims to universality. Virtue ethics offers a complementary approach, providing insights into moral character, offering a blend of reason and emotion, and paying attention to the context of decisions. The cases provided can be more adequately understood if we combine the approaches. Both should foster the virtues of humility and magnanimity.