Not Whether to Coordinate, But How: Concerns and Mechanism Choice Under a Mandate for Inter-Agency Coordination
Not Whether to Coordinate, But How: Concerns and Mechanism Choice Under a Mandate for Inter-Agency Coordination
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DOI：
10.1093/ppmgov/gvae003
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发表时间：
2024-03
影响因子：
3.2
通讯作者：
Anita Milman;Michael Roberts;Amber Walsh;William Blomquist
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Anita Milman;Michael Roberts;Amber Walsh;William Blomquist
与机构间协调有关的一个关键问题不仅是是否进行协调，而且是如何进行协调。当各机构接受自上而下的任务时，这个问题尤其突出。虽然机构间协调可以带来多种好处，但各机构往往对协调的潜在风险感到关切。不同的协调机制可能会减少或加剧这些关切。根据其协调方面的考虑，各机构将倾向于支持某些机制而不是其他机制。加州的可持续地下水管理法，授权当地机构协调的执行情况的检查表明，协调机制的选择是由机构持有的关注组合的影响，与自主权的考虑优先于其他问题。这些研究结果表明，有机会提高机构间协调理论的解释力，将潜在的层次结构的关注，他们的分布在多个机构的任务是协调，和配置效果。为此，我们提出了一个权变理论的机构关注和协调机制的选择下的任务，以协调。
A critical question in relation to inter-agency coordination is not only whether, but how, to coordinate. This question is particularly salient when agencies are subject to a top-down mandate. While inter-agency coordination can provide multiple benefits, agencies frequently have concerns about the potential risks of coordination. Differing coordination mechanisms may reduce or exacerbate those concerns. Depending on their coordination concerns, agencies will be inclined to favor certain mechanisms over others. Examination of the implementation of California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, which mandates local agency coordination, indicates that coordination mechanism selection is influenced by which combination of concerns agencies hold, with autonomy considerations taking priority over other concerns. These findings suggest opportunities to improve the explanatory power of theories of inter-agency coordination by incorporating potential hierarchies of concerns, their distribution across the multiple agencies tasked with coordinating, and configurational effects. To this end, we propose a contingency theory of agency concerns and coordination mechanism choice under a mandate to coordinate.