Haggling over viruses: the downside risks of securitizing infectious disease

Haggling over viruses: the downside risks of securitizing infectious disease
复制标题

DOI:
10.1093/heapol/czq050
复制
发表时间:
2010-11-01
影响因子:
3.2
通讯作者:
Elbe, Stefan
Elbe, Stefan
中科院分区:
医学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Elbe, Stefan

文献摘要

被引文献

相似文献

本文分析了高致病性禽流感(H5N1)的“证券化”如何导致发展中国家和发达国家之间旷日持久的国际病毒共享争端的兴起。随着对可能的人类H5N1大流行威胁的担忧在世界各地蔓延,许多政府争先恐后地囤积抗病毒药物和疫苗,尽管目前全球供应不足,无法满足如此迅速的需求激增。一些发展中国家意识到它们可能是这场国际竞赛中的“输家”,开始公开质疑维持现有形式的国际卫生合作的好处,特别是与国际社会其他国家共享国家病毒样本的普遍做法。鉴于这样的病毒样本对西方国家高级别的大流行防疫工作也至关重要,印尼政府尤其有勇气利用国际上获得的H5N1病毒样本作为谈判的外交筹码,以便让发展中国家更好地获得疫苗和其他好处。因此,全球应对H5N1病毒的证券化最终出人意料地将长期存在的国际病毒共享机制纠缠在一系列更广泛的政治争端中,并促使各国政府对现有的病毒共享安排进行更狭隘的国家利益考量。在未来几年,国际卫生合作面临的这些风险必须与全球卫生安全议程的政策吸引力相平衡。
This article analyses how the 'securitization' of highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) contributed to the rise of a protracted international virus-sharing dispute between developing and developed countries. As fear about the threat of a possible human H5N1 pandemic spread across the world, many governments scrambled to stockpile anti-viral medications and vaccines, albeit in a context where there was insufficient global supply to meet such a rapid surge in demand. Realizing that they were the likely 'losers' in this international race, some developing countries began to openly question the benefits of maintaining existing forms of international health cooperation, especially the common practice of sharing national virus samples with the rest of the international community. Given that such virus samples were also crucial to the high-level pandemic preparedness efforts of the West, the Indonesian government in particular felt emboldened to use international access to its H5N1 virus samples as a diplomatic 'bargaining chip' for negotiating better access to vaccines and other benefits for developing countries. The securitized global response to H5N1 thus ended up unexpectedly entangling the long-standing international virus-sharing mechanism within a wider set of political disputes, as well as prompting governments to subject existing virus-sharing arrangements to much narrower calculations of national interest. In the years ahead, those risks to international health cooperation must be balanced with the policy attractions of the global health security agenda.