Solutions for the stable roommates problem with payments
Solutions for the stable roommates problem with payments
复制标题
DOI:
10.1016/j.tcs.2013.03.027
复制
发表时间:
2012-06
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
P. Biró;M. Bomhoff;P. Golovach;W. Kern;D. Paulusma
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
P. Biró;M. Bomhoff;P. Golovach;W. Kern;D. Paulusma
The stable roommates problem with payments has as input a graph G=(V, E) with an edge weighting w: E→ R≥ 0 and the problem is to find a stable solution. A solution is a matching M with a vector p∈ R≥ 0 V that satisfies p u+ p v= w (u v) for all u v∈ M and p u= 0 for all u unmatched in M. A solution is stable if it prevents blocking pairs, ie, pairs of adjacent vertices u and v with p u+ p v< w (u v), or equivalently, if the total blocking value∑ u v∈ E max {0, w (u v)−(p u+ p v)}= 0. By pinpointing a relationship to the accessibility of the coalition structure core of matching games, we give a constructive proof for showing that every yes-instance of the stable roommates problem with payments allows a path of linear length that starts in an arbitrary unstable solution and that ends in a stable solution. This generalizes a result of Chen, Fujishige and Yang (2011)[4] for bipartite instances to general instances. We also show that the problems Blocking Pairs and Blocking Value, which are to find a solution with a minimum number of blocking pairs or a minimum total blocking value, respectively, are NP-hard. Finally, we prove that the variant of the first problem, in which the number of blocking pairs must be minimized with respect to some fixed matching, is NP-hard, whereas this variant of the second problem is polynomial-time solvable.