Future Conditions of Strategic Deterrence-猫眼课题宝

战略威慑的未来状况

DOI：

10.1007/978-1-349-06186-0_3

发表时间：

1980

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中科院分区：

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作者：

H. Bull

威慑一直是我们这个时代的主要战略思想，至少在西方世界是这样。随着有限战争的想法，它使我们能够说服自己，即使认识到爆发无限核战争将意味着政策的崩溃，武力仍然可以用作国家政策的工具。围绕相互核威慑的想法，我们建立了避免这种战争的希望。值得思考的是，在过去30年的过程中，威慑的概念在多大程度上渗透到我们的思想中。我们首先接受了一个简单的主张，即核武器国家可以通过核报复的威胁使自己免受另一个国家的攻击。我们学会了区分伯纳德·布罗迪所说的“威慑剖析”和构成威慑的要素：我们报复的意愿和能力，以及对手确信报复将带来的破坏是确定的和不可接受的。从这一点开始，他们试图详细说明，有时是量化，“威慑的要求”，说多少破坏是必要的，如何保证它，什么样的力量和水平足以完成它。我们不仅谈到核威慑，而且谈到常规甚至“次常规”攻击的威慑，并认识到所威胁的报复可以是分级的，从一个极端的大规模核报复到另一个极端的有限常规反应。因此，威慑的概念开始影响战略规划领域，远远超出了战略核武器的范围。我们区分了对我们自己、对盟国和其他第三方的攻击的威慑，因此产生了“扩展威慑”、核保护伞和保证及其“可信度”的概念。有人指出，威慑只是政治威慑的一种特殊情况

Deterrence has been the leading strategic idea of our times, at least in the Western world. Along with the idea of limited war, it has enabled us to persuade ourselves that force can still be used as an instrument of state policy, even while recognizing that the outbreak of an unlimited nuclear war would represent the breakdown of policy. Around the idea of mutual nuclear deterrence we have built our hopes of avoiding such a war.It is worth reflecting for a moment on the extent to which, in the course of the last 30 years, the idea of deterrence has come to permeate our thinking. We began by accepting the simple proposition that a nuclear weapon state can make itself secure against attack from another state by the threat of nuclear retaliation. We learned to distinguish what Bernard Brodie called the'anatomy of deterrence'and the components of which it is made up: our will and our capacity to retaliate, and the opponent's conviction that the destruction it will bring is assured and unacceptable. From this there followed the attempt to spell out, sometimes to quantify, the'requirements of deterrence', to say how much destruction was necessary, how assured it had to be and what kinds and levels of force were sufficient to accomplish it. We came to speak of deterrence not only of nuclear but also of conventional and even'subconventional'attack, and to recognize that the retaliation threatened could be graduated, ranging from massive nuclear retaliation at one extreme to limited conventional responses at the other. Thus the idea of deterrence came to infect realms of strategic planning far beyond the area of strategic nuclear weapons. We distinguished between deterrence of attack upon ourselves and upon allies and other third parties, and thus there arose concepts of'extended deterrence', of nuclear umbrellas and of guarantees and their'credibility'. It was pointed out that deterrence was only a special case of the political

Future Conditions of Strategic Deterrence

战略威慑的未来状况

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