Pay by Design: Teacher Performance Pay Design and the Distribution of Student Achievement

Pay by Design: Teacher Performance Pay Design and the Distribution of Student Achievement
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按设计付费:教师绩效工资设计和学生成绩分配

DOI:
10.1086/702625
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发表时间:
2019-07-01
影响因子:
3.8
通讯作者:
Shi, Yaojiang
Shi, Yaojiang
中科院分区:
经济学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Loyalka, Prashant;Sylvia, Sean;Shi, Yaojiang

文献摘要

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我们介绍了一项随机试验的结果,该试验测试了将学生成绩与教师奖励相对应的替代方法。中国西部的216所学校的教师被分配到绩效工资计划中,教师绩效评估采用三种不同的方法之一。我们发现,提供“按百分位数支付”激励的教师比提供基于班级平均成绩或一学年平均收益的简单激励方案的教师表现更好。此外,按百分位数付费的激励措施在班级内的学生中产生了广泛的收益。教师对激励计划相对复杂的特点做出反应,突显了密切关注绩效工资设计的重要性。
We present results of a randomized trial testing alternative approaches of mapping student achievement into rewards for teachers. Teachers in 216 schools in western China were assigned to performance pay schemes where teacher performance was assessed by one of three different methods. We find that teachers offered “pay-for-percentile” incentives outperform teachers offered simpler schemes based on class-average achievement or average gains over a school year. Moreover, pay-for-percentile incentives produced broad-based gains across students within classes. That teachers respond to relatively intricate features of incentive schemes highlights the importance of paying close attention to performance pay design.