Communication By Agonistic Displays: a Discussion
Communication By Agonistic Displays: a Discussion
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通过竞争性显示进行交流：讨论
DOI：
10.1163/156853980x00500
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发表时间：
1980
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Rhijn
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Rhijn
本文讨论了威胁信号的信息量。它试图解释以博弈论为工具的模型构建者（CARYL于1979年发表在本刊上的一篇论文中）和花费大量时间观察动物群体的行为学家（主要是实地的）观点之间的不一致性（例如，BOSSEMA和burgyer在本期的论文中所表达的观点）。提出了关于意图（动机）信息和关于“资源持有潜力”（实力、所有权等）信息的威胁信号传递的论点。个体识别被认为与关于意图的诚实信号有关。CARYL的偏离性发现不能归因于他所研究的动物缺乏个体识别。他的发现也不能很好地解释为他几乎没有考虑到微妙信号的事实，尽管本论文认为关于意图的信息主要是由微妙信号提供的，关于资源持有潜力的信息是由精心设计的行动模式提供的。CARYL引用的论文中不完善的方法被认为是导致偏差的最重要原因。最后，讨论了BOSSEMA和窃贼提供的观测数据在多大程度上有助于解决模型构建者提出的问题。频繁而短暂的升级被认为是防止虚张声势的一种机制。分级预警信号的演变可能与(1)与攻击相比，预警的成本较低，以及(2)基于不同动机的冲突解决有关。本文考虑了对手资源持有潜力（已知）信息和意图（来自显示）信息的异质求和的可能性。
This paper discussed the information content of threat signals. It was an attempt to explain the inconsistencies between the points of view of model-builders using game theory as a tool (represented in a paper by CARYL in 1979 in this journal), and of the (mainly field-) ethologists spending a considerable part of their time observing animals in groups (expressed for instance in the paper by BOSSEMA & BURGLER in this issue). Arguments were presented for the transfer by threat signals of both information about intentions (motivation), and information about "resource-holding potential" (strength, ownership, etc.). Individual recognition was expected to be associated with honest signals about intentions. CARYL'S deviating findings could not be attributed to an absence of individual recognition in the animals he considered. His findings could also not be explained very well by the fact that he hardly considered subtle signals, although the present paper argued that information about intentions is mainly given by subtle signals, and information about resource-holding potential by elaborate action patterns. Imperfect methods in the papers cited by CARYL were considered as the most important source for the deviations. Finally it has been discussed to what extent observational data as presented by BOSSEMA and BURGLER help in solving problems raised by the model-builders. The occurrence of frequent, short escalations has been suggested as a mechanism for preventing bluff. The evolution of graded warning-signals could be related to (1) the low cost of a warning as compared to an attack, and (2) the settlement of a conflict on the basis of differing motivations. This paper considered the possibility of heterogeneous summation of (already known) information about the resource-holding potential of an opponent, and the information about its intentions (from the displays).