Common Ownership and Market Entry: Evidence from Pharmaceutical Industry
Common Ownership and Market Entry: Evidence from Pharmaceutical Industry
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共同所有权和市场进入：来自制药行业的证据
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3194394
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Albert Banal
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Melissa Newham;J. Seldeslachts;Albert Banal
共同所有权--两家公司至少部分由同一投资者拥有--及其对产品市场结果的影响最近引起了学者和从业者的广泛关注。理论和实证研究表明，共同所有权可能导致更高的价格。本文着重于对市场进入的影响。为了估计共同所有权对进入决策的影响，我们专注于制药行业。特别是，我们认为仿制药公司进入美国监管保护结束后开放的药品市场的决定。我们首先提供了一个理论框架，表明品牌公司（现任）和潜在的通用进入者之间的共同所有权的更高水平降低了通用的激励进入。我们为这一预测提供了有力的证据。影响是巨大的：普通所有权增加一个标准差，通用进入的概率就会降低9- 13%。我们扩展了我们的基本理论框架，并允许多个进入者。我们的模型表明，对于足够高的共同所有权水平，进入决策的战略替代品的经典思想可以被逆转为战略补充。我们的实证结果为这些预测提供了一定的支持。
Common ownership - where two firms are at least partially owned by the same investor - and its impact on product market outcomes has recently drawn a lot of attention from scholars and practitioners alike. Theoretical and empirical research suggests that common ownership can lead to higher prices. This paper focuses on implications for market entry. To estimate the effect of common ownership on entry decisions, we focus on the pharmaceutical industry. In particular, we consider the entry decisions of generic pharmaceutical firms into drug markets opened up by the end of regulatory protection in the US. We first provide a theoretical framework that shows that a higher level of common ownership between the brand firm (incumbent) and potential generic entrant reduces the generic's incentives to entry. We provide robust evidence for this prediction. The effect is large: a one-standard-deviation increase in common ownership decreases the probability of generic entry by 9-13%. We extend our basic theoretical framework and allow for multiple entrants. Our model shows that for sufficiently high levels of common ownership, the classical idea of entry decisions being strategic substitutes can be reversed into being strategic complements. Our empirical results provide some support for these predictions.
DOI：
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发表时间：
2022
期刊：
影响因子：
--
作者：
白田康洋
通讯作者：
白田康洋