Economic Cold War: America's Embargo against China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949–1963
Economic Cold War: America's Embargo against China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949–1963
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经济冷战：美国对中国的禁运和中苏联盟，1949-1963
DOI：
10.1080/03612759.2002.10526182
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发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Stephen W. Twing
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Stephen W. Twing
作为伍德罗·威尔逊中心冷战国际历史项目系列的一部分，《经济冷战》对冷战历史文献和经济制裁文献都做出了宝贵贡献。马里兰大学美国历史和国际关系学教授张书祥撰写了一篇精彩的综合研究，探讨了美国主导的禁运及其对中国和中苏联盟的影响。按照国际历史上的最佳传统，张先生从禁运发起者（美国及其冷战盟友）和目标（中国和中苏联盟）的角度对经济制裁政策进行了权威的叙述。本书建立在多档案、多语言和多文化的大量研究基础上，使用了来自美国、英国、俄罗斯和中国的新资源。张对杜鲁门、艾森豪威尔和肯尼迪政府的制裁政策制定以及多边制裁制度不断演变的联盟政治进行了富有洞察力的叙述和分析。他研究了美国政策精英对中国制裁的看法的演变，以及美国政策制定者如何应对国际事态发展，例如中国对朝鲜战争的干预、英国主导的1956年至1959年间缩小多边对华差距的努力，以及1950年代末和1960年代初中苏分裂的新证据。他试图解释美国如何以及为何继续向其盟国施压，要求其维持严格的贸易管制，即使美国对制裁的有效性日益产生怀疑，盟国的反对意见也日益增强。他的结论是，一贯的政策目标是阻止中国对该地区的侵略并鼓励中苏分裂的发展。更有趣的是，他认为主观感知和文化因素对于解释这一时期美中制裁政策的模式至关重要。该研究从制裁目标的角度出发，探讨了中国共产党领导层为对抗制裁制度所做的国内和外交努力。张还详细分析了制裁对中苏同盟的影响，得出的结论是制裁加剧了经济、政治和文化紧张，导致了同盟的解体。经济冷战的唯一真正弱点在于未能将分析性制裁文献的深刻讨论与实质性历史讨论结合起来。除此之外，张从各个角度阐明了中国制裁制度，将美国决策、西方联盟政治、中国决策和中苏联盟政治的叙述精彩地编织在一起。对于所有研究冷战历史的学生（从本科生到专业学者）来说，这将是宝贵的资源。
Part of the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Cold War International History Project series, Eco-nomic Cold War is a valuable contribution both to the historical literature on the cold war and to the economic sanctions literature. A professor of US history and international relations at the University of Maryland, Shu Ciuang Zhang has written a fascinating comprehensive study of the US.-led embargo and its impact on China and the Sino-Soviet alliance. In the best tradition of international history, Zhang provides an authoritative narrative of the economic sanctions policy both from the perspective of the embargo’s initiators (the US. and its cold war allies) and from the perspective of its targets (China and the Sino-Soviet alliance). The book is built on a voluminous research base that is multiarchival, multilingual, and multicultural, using newly available sources from the United States, Britain, Russia, and China. Zhang provides an insightful narrative and analysis of sanctions policymaking in the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations, as well as of evolving interalliance politics regarding the multilateral sanctions regime. He examines the evolution of US policy elites’ thinking on China sanctions and how US policymakers responded to international developments, such as China’s intervention in the Korean War, the British-led efforts to scale back the multilateral China differential between 1956 and 1959, and emerging evidence of the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s and early 1960s. He seeks to explain how and why the United States continued to press its allies to maintain strict trade controls even in the face of emerging US doubts about the sanctions’ effectiveness and growing allied opposition. He concludes that the consistent policy objectives were to deter Chinese aggression in the region and to cncourage the development of a Sino-Soviet split. More interestingly, he argues that subjective perceptual and cultural factors are crucial for explaining the pattern of US.-China sanctions policy during the period. From the standpoint of the sanctions’ targets, the study explores the domestic and diplomatic efforts of the Chinese Communist Party leadership to counter the sanctions regime. Zhang also provides a detailed analysis of the impact of the sanctions on the Sino-Soviet alliance, concluding that the sanctions exacerbated economic, political, and cultural tensions, contributing to the unraveling of the alliance.The only real weakness in Economic Cold War stems from a failure to integrate the insightful discussion of the analytical sanctions literature with the substantive historical discussion. Otherwise, Zhang has illuminated the China sanctions regime from all angles, brilliantly weaving together narratives of US decision making, Western alliance politics, Chinese decision making, and Sino-Soviet alliance politics. It would be a valuable resource for all students of cold war history, from undergraduates to professional scholars.