Redistribution or Education? The Political Economy of the Social Race
Redistribution or Education? The Political Economy of the Social Race
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再分配还是教育？
DOI：
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发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
P. Profeta
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Michele Bernasconi;P. Profeta
在一个由富人和穷人两个社会阶层组成的世代重叠模型中，不同社会阶层的父母就两个问题进行投票：对他们的再分配政策和对他们孩子的教育投资。公共教育通过其对人力资本的影响是增长的引擎；但它也是贫穷家庭出生的孩子与富裕家庭出生的孩子交换地位的工具。这是因为教育降低了错配的可能性，即低天赋但来自富裕家庭的人被安排在应该留给高天赋的人的工作中(反之亦然)。通过概率投票，我们找到了投票博弈的政治经济学均衡。当穷人在政治上更具影响力时，与富人支持的政治制度相比，经济的特点是教育水平、增长水平和社会流动性更高；在前一种情况下，税前不平等程度更高，但税后水平更低。
In an overlapping generations model with two social classes, rich and poor, parents of the different social classes vote on two issues: redistributive policies for them and education investment for their children. Public education is the engine for growth through its effect on human capital; but it is also the vehicle through which children born to poor families may exchange their positions with children born to rich families. This is because education reduces the probability of a mismatch, i.e. individuals with low talent but coming from rich families being placed in jobs which should be reserved to people with high talent (and vice-versa). We find a political economy equilibrium of the voting game using probabilistic voting. When the poor are more politically influential, the economy is characterized by higher levels of education, growth and social mobility than under political regimes supported by the rich; pre-tax inequality is greater in the former case, but post-tax is lower.