Simple Relational Contracts to Motivate Capacity Investment: Price Only vs. Price and Quantity
Simple Relational Contracts to Motivate Capacity Investment: Price Only vs. Price and Quantity
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DOI：
10.1287/msom.1060.0126
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发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
T. Taylor;E. Plambeck
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
T. Taylor;E. Plambeck
由于产品开发和能力建设需要很长的准备时间，供应商必须在产品开发工作进行时就开始进行能力投资。由于产品在这个时间点上定义不清，买方无法通过法院强制执行的合同承诺未来的贸易条款。相反，为了激励产能投资，买方非正式地承诺未来的贸易条件。未来互动的前景会激励买方按照承诺向供应商付款。我们刻画了最优的价格和价格和数量的承诺，并比较他们的表现。如果生产成本低，或者产能成本低，或者折扣系数高，那么买方应该承诺购买特定数量，而不是简单地承诺支付单位价格;否则，买方应该简单地承诺支付特定的单位价格。
Because of long lead times associated with product development and building capacity, a supplier must initiate investment in capacity when the product development effort is ongoing. Because the product is ill defined at this point in time, the buyer is unable to commit to the future terms of trade through a court-enforceable contract. Instead, to provide incentives for capacity investment, the buyer informally promises future terms of trade. The prospect of future interaction creates an incentive for the buyer to pay the supplier as promised. We characterize optimal price-only and price-and-quantity promises and compare their performance. If the production cost is low and either the capacity cost is low or the discount factor is high, then the buyer should promise to purchase a specific quantity rather than simply promise to pay a per unit price; otherwise, the buyer should simply promise to pay a specified unit price.