Apparent mental causation -: Sources of the experience of will

Apparent mental causation -: Sources of the experience of will
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DOI:
10.1037/0003-066x.54.7.480
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发表时间:
1999-07-01
影响因子:
16.4
通讯作者:
Wheatley, T
Wheatley, T
中科院分区:
心理学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Wegner, DM;Wheatley, T

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愿意行为的经历是由于将自己的思想解释为行为的原因而产生的。因此,有意识的意志是对行动思想的优先级,一致性和排他性的函数。想法必须在动作之前发生,与动作保持一致,并且不伴随!其他原因。一项表明优先事项的实验发现,人们可能会错误地相信他们故意造成了一种行动,实际上,当他们只是在发生之前就考虑采取行动时,他们被迫执行。
The experience of willing an act arises from interpreting one's thought as the cause of the act. Conscious will is thus experienced as a function of the priority, consistency, and exclusivity of the thought about the action. The thought must occur before the action, be consistent with the action, and not be accompanied! by other causes. An experiment illustrating the pale of priority found that people can arrive at the mistaken belief that they have intentionally caused an action that in fact they were forced to perform when they are simply led to think about the action just before its occurrence.