On Optimal Lifetime Redistribution Policy

On Optimal Lifetime Redistribution Policy
复制标题

论最优生命周期再分配策略

DOI:
10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01452.x
复制
发表时间:
2010
影响因子:
1.1
通讯作者:
Matti Tuomala
Matti Tuomala
中科院分区:
经济学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Sanna Tenhunen;Matti Tuomala

文献摘要

被引文献

相似文献

在本文中,我们研究了各个方面的最佳终身再分配政策在一个队列。当社会中的个体不仅在生产率上存在差异,而且在时间偏好或近视上也存在差异时,我们研究了最优的再分配政策。我们将Diamond(2003)关于储蓄非线性税收的分析推广到三型和四型模型中。我们的研究结果提供了一个合理的扭曲(向上和向下)在储蓄行为在一个简单的两个时期的模型,高技能和低技能的个人有不同的不可观察的时间偏好超出他们的收入能力。如果我们解释我们的模型,使没有私人储蓄,但在第二阶段的养老金的公共提供,那么在不同版本(和不同的参数化)的三种类型的模型,我们发现的U形模式的替代率。我们的数值结果表明,退休消费是分散比第一阶段的消费在家长式的情况下,而在福利主义的情况下,顺序是相反的。我们的数值模拟还表明,当一些人近视时,老年人的消费应该比年轻人的消费分散。此外,我们的数值结果表明,当经济中有近视的个人,家长式的政府政策增加储蓄,使储蓄大于家长式的政府政策,没有近视的个人。
In this paper we examine various aspects of the optimal lifetime redistribution policy within a cohort. We characterise optimal redistribution policy when society consists of individuals who do not differ only in productivity, but also in time preference or myopia. We extend Diamond’s (2003) analysis on nonlinear taxation of savings into the three and four type models. Our results provide a rationale for distortions (upward and downward) in savings behaviour in a simple two period model where high skilled and low skilled individuals have different non-observable time preferences beyond their earning capacity. If we interpret our model so that there is no private savings, but public provision of pension in period 2, then in different versions (and different parameterization) of three type model we find the U-shaped pattern of the replacement rates. Our numerical results suggest that the retirement consumption is less dispersed than the first period consumption in a paternalistic case, whereas in a welfarist case the ordering is reversed. Our numerical simulations also show that consumption when old should be less dispersed than consumption when young when some individuals are myopic. Moreover our numerical results suggest that when there are myopic individuals in the economy, a paternalistic government policy increases saving and makes saving larger than with paternalist government policy where there are no myopic individuals.