Prototypical reasoning about species and the species problem
Prototypical reasoning about species and the species problem
复制标题
关于物种和物种问题的原型推理
DOI：
10.1007/s13752-015-0204-4
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Yuichi Amitani
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
秋元ひろと;大河内泰樹;秋元ひろと;大河内泰樹;秋元ひろと;大河内泰樹;秋元ひろと;秋元ひろと;大河内泰樹;大河内泰樹;大河内泰樹;TAIJU OKOCHI;大河内泰樹;Yuichi Amitani;TAIJU OKOCHI;Yuichi Amitani
The species problem is often described as the abundance of conflicting definitions ofspecies, such as the biological species concept and phylogenetic species concepts. But biologists understand the notion of species in a non-definitional as well as a definitional way. In this article I argue that when they understandspecieswithout a definition in their mind, their understanding is often mediated by the notion ofgood species, or prototypical species, as the idea of “prototype” is explicated in cognitive psychology. This distinction helps us make sense of several puzzling phenomena regarding biologists’ dealing with species, such as the fact that in everyday research biologists often behave as if the species problem is solved, while they should be fully aware that it is not. I also briefly discuss implications of this finding, including that some extant attempts to answer what the nature of species is have an inadequate assumption about how the notion of species is represented in biologists’ minds.
