On the Political Economy of Education Subsidies
On the Political Economy of Education Subsidies
复制标题
论教育补贴的政治经济学
DOI：
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发表时间：
1995
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Richard Rogerson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Raquel Fernández;Richard Rogerson
公共教育提供的标准模型预测了资源从高收入个体向低收入个体的隐性转移。许多研究证明，公立高等教育涉及反向转移。我们表明，这种再分配模式是一种均衡的结果，在这种模式下，教育只是部分公共提供，个人投票决定补贴的程度。我们描述了这样一种经济：穷人实际上被排除在接受教育的机会之外，他们缴纳的税款帮助抵消了其他人获得教育的成本。我们表明，收入分配不平等的加剧使这种结果更有可能出现，而这种排斥的效率影响取决于经济的财富。
Standard models of public education provision predict an implicit transfer of resources from higher-income individuals toward lower-income individuals. Many studies have documented that public higher education involves a transfer in the reverse direction. We show that this pattern of redistribution is an equilibrium outcome in a model in which education is only partially publicly provided and individuals vote over the extent to which it is subsidized. We characterize economies in which poorer individuals are effectively excluded from obtaining an education and their tax payments help offset the cost of education obtained by others. We show that increased inequality in the income distribution makes this outcome more likely and that the efficiency implications of this exclusion depend on the wealth of the economy.