A practical secure neighbor verification protocol for wireless sensor networks

A practical secure neighbor verification protocol for wireless sensor networks
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DOI:
10.1145/1514274.1514302
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发表时间:
2009-03
期刊:
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影响因子:
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通讯作者:
R. Shokri;Marcin Poturalski;G. Ravot;Panos Papadimitratos;J. Hubaux
R. Shokri;Marcin Poturalski;G. Ravot;Panos Papadimitratos;J. Hubaux
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
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作者:
R. Shokri;Marcin Poturalski;G. Ravot;Panos Papadimitratos;J. Hubaux

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无线网络依赖于一个基本的构建块,邻居发现(ND)。然而,无线通信的性质使得对ND的攻击变得容易:对手可以简单地在网络上重播或中继(虫洞)数据包,并误导断开连接的节点相信它们直接通信。这种攻击可能会危及覆盖协议和应用程序。文献中提出的方法寻求保护ND,允许节点验证它们是邻居。然而,它们要么依赖于专门的硬件或基础设施,要么提供有限的安全性。本文针对这些问题,设计了一个实用且安全的受限无线传感器网络邻居验证协议。我们的方案依赖于节点之间的估计距离和简单的几何测试,它是完全分布式的。我们证明了我们的协议是安全的,对经典的2端虫洞攻击。此外,我们提供了一个概念验证的实现与现成的无线传感器网络设备:板球微尘。
Wireless networking relies on a fundamental building block, neighbor discovery (ND). The nature of wireless communications, however, makes attacks against ND easy: An adversary can simply replay or relay (wormhole) packets across the network and mislead disconnected nodes into believing that they communicate directly. Such attacks can compromise the overlying protocols and applications. Proposed methods in the literature seek to secure ND, allowing nodes to verify they are neighbors. However, they either rely on specialized hardware or infrastructure, or offer limited security. In this paper, we address these problems, designing a practical and secure neighbor verification protocol for constrained Wireless Sensor networks (WSNs). Our scheme relies on estimated distance between nodes and simple geometric tests, and it is fully distributed. We prove our protocol is secure against the classic 2-end wormhole attack. Moreover, we provide a proof-of-concept implementation with off-the-shelf WSN equipment: Cricket motes.