Provincial Official Turnover and Bank Loans
Provincial Official Turnover and Bank Loans
复制标题
省级官方营业额和银行贷款
DOI：
10.1016/j.pacfin.2019.101202
复制
发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
4.6
通讯作者：
Xianhang Qian
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Chunfang Cao;Yizhe Dong;Wenxuan Hou;Yue Liu;Xianhang Qian
Based on the turnover data of provincial party committee secretaries in China between 2000 and 2008, we find that the loan increment of local SOEs (state-owned enterprises) decreases by 18.9% in turnover years. We also document increased efficiency of long-term loans in turnover years. The effects of provincial leader turnover on bank loans only exist for local SOEs in eastern regions and more marketized provinces. Local officials have less of a political incentive to exert influence on bank credit allocation in turnover years, and therefore banks act as more effective intermediaries in optimizing credit allocation and improving the efficiency of loans.
