Modularity and the predictive mind
Modularity and the predictive mind
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模块化和预测思维
DOI：
10.15502/9783958573130
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Zoe Drayson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Zoe Drayson
心智架构的模块化方法声称，一些心智机制，如感觉输入过程，在功能上独立于心智的其他部分的特殊目的子系统中运作。这种模块化的假设似乎与最近声称大脑具有预测结构的说法相矛盾。预测方法提出，感觉处理和高级处理都是同一个贝叶斯信息处理层次的一部分，感知和认知之间没有明确的界限。此外，考虑到层次结构的每一层都受到上一层的影响，预测体系结构的任何部分如何在功能上独立尚不清楚。预测体系结构的连续性假设和部分预测体系结构的不可隔离性似乎都与模块化方法不一致。我探索并最终拒绝了预测方法对连续性和非孤立性的明显承诺。我认为预测体系结构可以是模块化的体系结构，而且我们实际上应该期望预测体系结构表现出某种形式的模块化。
Modular approaches to the architecture of the mind claim that some mental mechanisms, such as sensory input processes, operate in special-purpose subsystems that are functionally independent from the rest of the mind. This assumption of modularity seems to be in tension with recent claims that the mind has a predictive architecture. Predictive approaches propose that both sensory processing and higher-level processing are part of the same Bayesian information-processing hierarchy, with no clear boundary between perception and cognition. Furthermore, it is not clear how any part of the predictive architecture could be functionally independent, given that each level of the hierarchy is influenced by the level above. Both the assumption of continuity across the predictive architecture and the seeming non-isolability of parts of the predictive architecture seem to be at odds with the modular approach. I explore and ultimately reject the predictive approach’s apparent commitments to continuity and non-isolation. I argue that predictive architectures can be modular architectures, and that we should in fact expect predictive architectures to exhibit some form of modularity.