New Attacks on IDEA with at Least 6 Rounds
New Attacks on IDEA with at Least 6 Rounds
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DOI：
10.1007/s00145-013-9162-9
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发表时间：
2015-04
影响因子：
3
通讯作者：
E. Biham;O. Dunkelman;Nathan Keller;A. Shamir
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
E. Biham;O. Dunkelman;Nathan Keller;A. Shamir
IDEA是Lai和Massey于1991年提出的一种64位分组密码，密钥为128位。以前发表的对IDEA的最佳攻击只能处理其8.5轮中的6轮。在本文中，我们结合联合收割机的高度优化的中间相遇攻击与Biryukov-Demirci关系的无密钥版本，以获得一个大大改进的攻击6轮IDEA，它只需要两个已知的明文，并与6.5至8.5轮的IDEA版本的第一个密钥恢复攻击。
IDEA is a 64-bit block cipher with 128-bit keys which was introduced by Lai and Massey in 1991. The best previously published attack on IDEA could only handle 6 of its 8.5-rounds. In this paper, we combine a highly optimized meet-in-the-middle attack with a keyless version of the Biryukov–Demirci relation to obtain a greatly improved attack on 6-round IDEA which requires only two known plaintexts, and the first key recovery attacks on versions of IDEA with 6.5 to 8.5 rounds.