Last corrupt deed before retirement? Evidence from a lower middle-income country
Last corrupt deed before retirement? Evidence from a lower middle-income country
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jdeveco.2021.102673
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发表时间：
2021-04-27
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
Cuong Viet Nguyen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Cuong Viet Nguyen
We provide evidence of the effect of term limits on the rent-seeking behavior of directors of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Vietnam by showing that these directors recruit substantially more employees just before retirement. We argue that a possible motive of these directors for the over-recruitment is to obtain bribes from employees, since the increase in employment is not associated with higher output, and the effect of these directors' last year in office on SOE labor is smaller in provinces with better corruption control. This finding also provides an explanation why SOEs tend to have an excess of labor and suggests that privatization can reduce this excess.
