Market Consequences of Earnings Management in Response to Security Regulations in China
Market Consequences of Earnings Management in Response to Security Regulations in China
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DOI：
10.1506/9xvl-p6rr-mtpx-vu8k
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发表时间：
2005-03
影响因子：
3.6
通讯作者：
I. Haw;D. Qi;Donghui Wu;Woody Wu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
I. Haw;D. Qi;Donghui Wu;Woody Wu
根据中国1996 - 98年的证券法规，会计净资产收益率（ROE）必须连续三年高于10%，公司才有资格获得股权要约。尽管这一时期的经济状况有所下降，但报告净资产收益率在10%至11%之间的公司比例约为1994 - 95年的“三倍”。这种独特的监管环境为盈余管理行为及其后果的实证评估提供了自然的实验环境。本研究考察了中国上市公司是否通过盈余管理来达到监管基准，以及监管机构和投资者在各自的监管和投资决策中是否考虑了盈余质量。以1996 ~ 1998年中国上市公司为样本，我们观察到管理层在配股时，为了达到规定的净资产收益率目标，会进行“线下”交易，并使用增加收益的会计应计项目。申请但未获得监管机构批准的公司比获得批准的公司和配对的控制公司更显著地管理收益。我们的市场研究还表明，投资者区分收益的质量，并把更少的价值放在怀疑更大程度的管理收益上。总的来说，我们的研究结果表明，监管机构和投资者在一定程度上对盈余质量进行了合理的调整。
Under the 1996†98 security regulations in China, the accounting rate of return on equity (ROE) has to be greater than 10 percent for three "consecutive" years for a firm to qualify for stock rights offers. Despite declining economic conditions during this period, the percentage of firms reporting ROE between 10 and 11 percent is about "three" times that for 1994†95. This unique regulatory environment provides a natural experimental setting for the empirical assessment of earnings†management behavior and its consequences. This study examines whether listed Chinese firms manage earnings to meet regulatory benchmarks and whether regulators and investors consider the quality of earnings in their respective regulatory and investment decisions. On the basis of a sample of listed Chinese firms from 1996 to 1998, we observe that managers execute transactions involving below†the†line items and use income†increasing accounting accruals to meet regulatory ROE targets for stock rights offerings. The firms that apply for, but fail to receive, regulatory approval manage earnings more significantly than do firms that receive approval and pair†matched control firms. Our market study also suggests that investors differentiate the quality of earnings and put less value on earnings suspected of a greater degree of management. Overall, our results imply that the regulatory bodies and investors to some extent make rational adjustments for the quality of earnings.