Rewarding Bad Behavior: How Governments Respond to Terrorism in Civil War
Rewarding Bad Behavior: How Governments Respond to Terrorism in Civil War
复制标题
奖励不良行为：政府如何应对内战中的恐怖主义
DOI：
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Jakana L. Thomas
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jakana L. Thomas
尽管暴力组织经常利用恐怖主义作为实现政治目的的手段，但最近的研究表明，这种策略是无效的，因为它无法帮助团体获得让步。虽然这些研究只关注让步，但忽视了成功的其他重要标志，特别是团体是否因使用恐怖主义而被邀请参加谈判。现有研究还对过度汇总的数据进行统计分析，掩盖了恐怖主义对重要谈判结果的影响。本文利用关于谈判发生率和向参与非洲内战的团体提供的让步数量的新月度数据表明，当反叛团体在内战期间实施更多的恐怖袭击时，他们更有可能获得参与谈判的机会，并提供更多的让步。
Although violent organizations often use terrorism as a means to achieve political aims, recent studies suggest the tactic is ineffective because it fails to help groups gain concessions. While focused exclusively on concessions, these studies overlook other important markers of success, specifically whether groups are invited to participate in negotiations as a result of their use of terrorism. Extant studies also conduct statistical analyses on overly aggregated data, masking any effect terrorism has on important bargaining outcomes. Using new monthly data on the incidence of negotiations and the number of concessions offered to groups involved in African civil wars, this paper demonstrates that rebel groups are both more likely to be granted the opportunity to participate in negotiations and offered more concessions when they execute a greater number of terror attacks during civil wars.