Net Load Redistribution Attacks on Nodal Voltage Magnitude Estimation in AC Distribution Networks
Net Load Redistribution Attacks on Nodal Voltage Magnitude Estimation in AC Distribution Networks
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DOI：
10.1109/isgt-europe47291.2020.9248915
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发表时间：
2020-05
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Hang Zhang;Bo Liu;Hongyu Wu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Hang Zhang;Bo Liu;Hongyu Wu
智能设备和通信网络的高度渗透增加了配电系统中网络攻击的威胁。本文建立了交流配电系统中隐藏的、协调的净负荷重分配攻击模型。基于攻击区域的局部信息，攻击者的目标是在节点电压值估计中产生违例。作为具有全局交流状态估计和坏数据检测的系统算子，我们验证了隐藏NLRA在多种攻击情况下的隐身性。对改进后的PG&E 69节点配电系统的仿真结果表明了该方法的有效性。评估了NLRA对配电系统的影响，揭示了攻击区域、攻击时机和系统可观测性的影响。
A high penetration level of smart devices and communication networks increases the threat of cyber-attacks in the distribution system. In this paper, we model a hidden, coordinated, net load redistribution attack (NLRA) in an AC distribution system. Based on local information of an attack region, the attacker’s goal is to create violations in nodal voltage magnitude estimation. Acting as a system operator equipped with global AC state estimation and bad data detection, we validate the stealthiness of the hidden NLRA in multiple attack cases. Simulation results on a modified PG&E 69-node distribution system show the validity of the proposed NLRA. The influence of NLRA on the distribution system is assessed and the impact of attack regions, attack timing, and system observability is also revealed.