Monotonicity and Consistency in Matching Markets
Monotonicity and Consistency in Matching Markets
复制标题
匹配市场的单调性和一致性
DOI：
10.1007/s00182-005-0002-5
复制
发表时间：
2006
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
M. Toda
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Toda
目的：获得一对一和一对多匹配市场的核心的公理化刻画。方法：将最近用于刻画分配博弈核心的公理化方法应用到本文的模型中。结果：一对一匹配市场的核心是由两个不同的公理列表。第一种是弱单调性、种群单调性和Maskin单调性。第二类是弱单调性、种群单调性和一致性。如果我们允许弱偏好，则核心的特征在于弱一致性、总体单调性、马斯金单调性和一致性。对于一对多匹配，与严格偏好情况下相同的列表表征了核心。结论：离散匹配市场的核心的特征公理几乎与连续匹配市场的核心特征公理重叠。这提供了一个公理化的解释，在文献中的观察，几乎平行的性质得到的核心的两个模型。我们观察到Maskin单调性与匹配市场的一致性密切相关
Objective: To obtain axiomatic characterizations of the core of one-to-one and one-to-many matching markets. Methods: The axioms recently applied to characterize the core of assignment games were adapted to the models of this paper. Results: The core of one-to-one matching markets is characterized by two different lists of axioms. The first one consists of weak unanimity, population monotonicity, and Maskin monotonicity. The second consists of weak unanimity, population monotonicity, and consistency. If we allow for weak preferences, the core is characterized by weak unanimity, population monotonicity, Maskin monotonicity, and consistency. For one-to-many matchings, the same lists as for the case of strict preferences characterize the core. Conclusions: The cores of the discrete matching markets are characterized by axioms that almost overlap with the axioms characterizing the core of the continuous matching markets. This provides an axiomatic explanation for the observations in the literature that almost parallel properties are obtained for the core of the two models. We observe that Maskin monotonicity is closely related to consistency in matching markets