Free Trade Networks
Free Trade Networks
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.438502
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发表时间：
2003-06
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
T. Furusawa;Hideo Konishi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
T. Furusawa;Hideo Konishi
本文将自由贸易协定 (FTA) 的形成视为网络形成博弈。我们考虑一个一般的 n 国模型，其中各国贸易有差异的工业商品以及计价商品。各国的工业品行业规模（企业衡量标准）和市场规模（人口规模）可能有所不同。他们签署自由贸易协定的动机取决于其本国及其伙伴国家的这些特点。我们证明，如果所有国家都是对称的，则完整的全球自由贸易网络是成对稳定的，并且在工业品不具有高度替代性的情况下，它是唯一的稳定网络。我们还比较了自由贸易协定和关税同盟（CU），看看这两种制度中哪一个有利于全球贸易自由化，并强调与关税同盟不同的是，签署自由贸易协定的每个国家都可以与外部国家签订新的自由贸易协定，而无需其他成员国的同意。
The paper examines the formation of free trade agreements (FTAs) as a network formation game. We consider a general n-country model in which countries trade differentiated industrial commodities as well as a numeraire good. Countries may be different in the size of the industrial good industry (measure of firms) and the market size (population size). Their incentives to sign an FTA depend on these characteristics of their own countries and those of their partner countries. We show that if all countries are symmetric, a complete global free trade network is pairwise stable and it is the unique stable network if industrial commodities are not highly substitutable. We also compare FTAs and customs unions (CUs) as to which of these two regimes facilitate global trade liberalization, emphasizing the fact that unlike in the case of a CU, each country signing an FTA can have a new FTA with an outside country without consent of other member countries.