Market Structure, Durability, and Maintenance Effort
Market Structure, Durability, and Maintenance Effort
复制标题
市场结构、耐久性和维护工作
DOI:
10.2307/2296716
复制
发表时间:
1974
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
R. Schmalensee
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
R. Schmalensee
Peter Swan [11, 12] has recently shown that under a number of strong assumptions a profit-maximizing monopolist should produce durable goods of exactly the same durability as a competitive industry with the same cost structure.3 The present paper relaxes one of Swan's assumptions and allows maintenance to be performed on the durable good in question in order to reduce the rate at which it deteriorates. We investigate market equilibrium in such a situation, and we show that durability is not independent of market structure when the good is sold rather than rented. Consumers, who may be firms or households, are assumed not to value durability as such; they are only concerned with the available flow of services of the good. This flow is assumed proportional to the stock of the good, and, without loss of generality, we take the proportionality constant to be unity. When the good is sold, it is assumed that buyers in turn can buy, sell, or rent in perfect secondhand markets. Capital markets are also perfect, so that producers and their customers can borrow or lend unlimited amounts at the same (continuously compounded) rate of interest. Strictly constant returns to scale are posited, in that the marginal cost of producing a unit of the good depends only on its built-in durability and not on the rate of production.4 Customers are assumed to have perfect foresight.5 The good involved is assumed to deteriorate or decay exponentially. The new assumption is that the decay rate depends on the built-in decay rate, i.e. the durability the good is endowed with when it is manufactured, and on the level of maintenance spending per unit. Maintenance services are thus assumed to be in perfectly elastic supply. It is assumed that maintenance spending is always determined by the owner of the good, who is the manufacturer when the good is rented but the buyer when the good is sold. As these parties have different objectives, they may choose different maintenance policies. To the extent that they do this, the equilibrium values of the quantities under the manufacturer's control may depend on whether the good is rented or sold. The following notation is employed: