Tariffs as Signals of Uncompetitiveness
Tariffs as Signals of Uncompetitiveness
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关税是缺乏竞争力的信号
DOI：
10.1111/1467-9396.00182
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发表时间：
1999
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
M. Hviid
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
D. Collie;M. Hviid
在本文中，一个国内和一个外国公司在国内市场上竞争的古诺双寡头。外国公司对国内公司的成本信息不完全，但国内政府和国内公司完全知情。结果表明，国内政府可以使用它的关税信号的国内企业的成本。在分离均衡中，国内政府通过设定低于完全信息下最优水平的关税来表明国内企业的不竞争性。
In this paper, a domestic and a foreign firm compete as Cournot duopolists in the domestic market. The foreign firm has incomplete information about the costs of the domestic firm, but the domestic government and the domestic firm are completely informed. It is shown that the domestic government can use its tariff to signal about the costs of the domestic firm. In the separating equilibrium, the domestic government signals the uncompetitiveness of the domestic firm by setting a lower tariff than is optimal under complete information.