Entry, Exit, and Imperfect Competition in the Long Run
Entry, Exit, and Imperfect Competition in the Long Run
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长期的进入、退出和不完全竞争
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.989929
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发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Val E. Lambson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Amir;Val E. Lambson
建立了一个具有沉没成本和不完全竞争的无限时域随机进入和退出模型。简单的例子提供了对以下问题的见解：（1）沉没成本和行业集中度之间的关系，（2）当前利润为负时的进入，以及（3）进入和产品周期长度之间的关系。一般动态随机博弈的子博弈完美纳什均衡被证明是有限时间内均衡的极限。这种均衡具有相对简单的结构，其特征在于每个有限历史中有两个数字。在非常一般的条件下，它往往表现出相对于社会最优的过度进入和不足的退出。
An infinite-horizon, stochastic model of entry and exit with sunk costs and imperfect competition is constructed. Simple examples provide insights into: (1) the relationship between sunk costs and industry concentration, (2) entry when current profits are negative, and (3) the relationship between entry and the length of the product cycle. A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the general dynamic stochastic game is shown to exist as a limit of finite-horizon equilibria. This equilibrium has a relatively simple structure characterized by two numbers per finite history. Under very general conditions, it tends to exhibit excessive entry and insufficient exit relative to a social optimum.