Optimal Procurement Design in the Presence of Supply Risk
Optimal Procurement Design in the Presence of Supply Risk
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DOI：
10.1287/msom.1100.0319
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发表时间：
2011-03-01
影响因子：
6.3
通讯作者：
Martinez-de-Albeniz, Victor
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Chaturvedi, Aadhaar;Martinez-de-Albeniz, Victor
研究了供应商交货不确定时的最优拍卖设计问题。我们考虑一个买方面对多个潜在的供应商，每个供应商都有一个相关的（外生的）可靠性，量化其供应失败的风险。我们设计的最佳机制，取决于买方的信息水平，供应商的生产成本和可靠性。当供应商的可靠性是已知的，我们发现，最优分配类似于完全信息下的分配，但膨胀的生产成本。当供应商的成本和可靠性相互独立时，当供应商的成本和可靠性此外，买方不必为有关供应商可靠性的信息支付任何租金。此外，我们评估的好处相比，传统的拍卖，忽略供应风险的最佳机制。
This paper analyzes optimal auction design when delivery of supply is uncertain. We consider a buyer facing multiple potential suppliers, each having an associated (exogenous) reliability that quantifies its risk of supply failure. We design optimal mechanisms that depend on the buyer's level of information regarding the suppliers' cost of production and reliability. When supplier reliability is known, we find that the optimal allocation resembles the allocation under full information, but with inflated production costs. When it is unknown, the same result is true when cost and reliability of a supplier are independent. Furthermore, the buyer does not have to pay any rent for information on suppliers' reliability. Moreover, we assess the benefits of the optimal mechanism compared to traditional auctions that ignore supply risk.