Optimal Capacity Mechanisms for Competitive Electricity Markets
Optimal Capacity Mechanisms for Competitive Electricity Markets
复制标题
竞争性电力市场的最佳容量机制
作者：
P. Holmberg;Robert A. Ritz
容量机制越来越多地用于世界各地的电力市场设计，但其作用仍然存在激烈争论。本文介绍了在具有多种不同传统发电技术的竞争性电力市场中容量机制的新基准模型。我们考虑了两种政策工具，即批发价格上限和容量支付，并展示了这些工具的哪些组合会引发市场的社会最优投资。我们的分析得出了基于系统成本外部性内部化的容量机制的基本原理，即使价格上限设定为负载损失的价值。在扩展中，（i）我们展示了在称为“不完美系统可替代性”的新条件下，增加可变可再生能源渗透率如何增强对容量支付的需求，以及（ii）我们概述了具有目标容量支付的战略储备的社会最优设计。
Capacity mechanisms are increasingly used in electricity market design around the world yet their role remains hotly debated. This paper introduces a new benchmark model of a capacity mechanism in a competitive electricity market with many different conventional generation technologies. We consider two policy instruments, a wholesale price cap and a capacity payment, and show which combinations of these instruments induce socially-optimal investment by the market. Our analysis yields a rationale for a capacity mechanism based on the internalization of a system-cost externality—even where the price cap is set at the value of lost load.In extensions, (i) we show how increasing variable renewables penetration can enhance the need for a capacity payment under a novel condition called “imperfect system substitutability”, and (ii) we outline the socially-optimal design of a strategic reserve with a targeted capacity payment.