Softening Competition by Inducing Switching in Credit Markets
Softening Competition by Inducing Switching in Credit Markets
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DOI：
10.1111/j.0022-1821.2004.00215.x
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发表时间：
2004-03
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
H. Degryse;Jan Bouckaert
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
H. Degryse;Jan Bouckaert
我们表明，竞争银行放松整体竞争，诱导借款人转换贷款人。我们说明了我们的研究结果在两个时期的模型与逆向选择，银行战略承诺披露借款人信息。通过这样做，他们邀请竞争对手窃取他们的第一阶段市场。借款人信息的披露增加了竞争对手的第二期利润。这抑制了为第一阶段市场服务的竞争。
We show that competing banks relax overall competition by inducing borrowers to switch lenders. We illustrate our findings in a two-period model with adverse selection where banks strategically commit to disclosing borrower information. By doing this, they invite rivals to poach their first-period market. Disclosure of borrower information increases the rival's second-period profits. This dampens competition for serving the first-period market.