Pareto-improving immigration in an economy with equilibrium unemployment
Pareto-improving immigration in an economy with equilibrium unemployment
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失业均衡经济中的帕累托改进移民
DOI：
10.1111/1468-0297.00492
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Javier Ortega
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Javier Ortega
提出了一个充满活力的两国劳动力匹配经济。工人们决定是在本国找工作还是在国外找工作(要承担额外的费用)。每个国家的公司发布的职位空缺数量取决于在该国境内搜索的工人的平均特征。工资是在个人纳什交易中确定的。我们证明了多个稳态均衡的存在性：一个非迁移均衡和两个迁移均衡。均衡的多样性是由于一种自我实现的预言现象，将平均工资与移民动机联系在一起。均衡是帕累托排序的，迁移均衡主导着非迁移。
A dynamic two-country labour matching economy is presented. Workers decide whether to search in their native country or look for a job abroad (bearing an additional cost). The number of vacancies posted by firms in each country depends on the average characteristics of the workers searching inside that country. Wages are determined in an individual Nash bargain. We show the existence of multiple steady-state equilibria: one no-migration equilibrium and two migration equilibria. The multiplicity of equilibria is due to a self-fulfilling prophecy phenomenon linking average wages and incentives to migrate. The equilibria are Pareto-ranked, with migration-equilibria dominating no-migration.