The Effects of Mergers in Open Auction Markets
The Effects of Mergers in Open Auction Markets
复制标题
公开竞价市场中合并的影响
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.307981
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发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Martin K. Perry
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
K. Waehrer;Martin K. Perry
买方从供应商那里征求投标，根据他们的能力定义不同的成本分布。每个供应商的预期市场份额是其产能与行业产能的比率。买方的最优保留价随着产业集中度的增加而下降。较低的保留价可以部分或全部抵消合并的价格影响。然而，合并仍然降低了买方的福利，因为内部生产成本更高的可能性增加了。较低的保留价格还可能削弱大型供应商合并的动力，并导致稳定的行业结构，使进一步的合并无法获利。
The buyer solicits bids from suppliers with different cost distributions defined by their capacities. The expected market share of each supplier is the ratio of its capacity to the industry capacity. The buyer's optimal reserve price declines with increases in the concentration of the industry. The lower reserve price can partially or fully offset the price effects of a merger. However, a merger still reduces the buyer's welfare because there is an increased probability of internal production at a higher cost. The lower reserve price can also undermine the incentive for larger suppliers to merge and result in stable industry structures for which no further mergers would be profitable.