Considering asymmetrical manufacturing cost information in a two-echelon system that uses price-only contracts
Considering asymmetrical manufacturing cost information in a two-echelon system that uses price-only contracts
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DOI：
10.1080/07408170590961148
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发表时间：
2006-03
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
A. Lau;Hon-Shiang Lau;Yong-Wu Zhou
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Lau;Hon-Shiang Lau;Yong-Wu Zhou
考虑一个基本的“仅限价格”的供应链互动，其中的“参与者”是制造商和零售商。制造商为其供应给零售商的产品设定批发价格（$w/单位），零售商再为其销售给消费者的产品设定零售价格（$p/单位）。产品的需求曲线是p的函数。玩家选择玩几种非合作游戏中的一种，比如制造商- stackelberg游戏。玩家应该如何设定他们的价格w和p？大多数现有研究假设信息对称，即成本和市场参数对双方都是平等和完美的。实际上，零售商对制造成本c的了解通常是由制造商控制的。本文明确地考虑了c中知识的不对称性。这种方法揭示了与早期对称c知识结果的有趣和令人惊讶的偏差。此外，该方法还改善了对称信息框架内部的一些不一致性。我们还展示了知识不对称的影响如何随着需求曲线的形状和参与者之间的相对优势程度而变化。我们发现，在线性需求曲线下，制造商应该夸大c，这是一个直观的预期结果。然而，在等弹性需求曲线下，她通过低估c而使自己和整个系统受益，这是违反直觉的。此外，在非对称c知识下，同时决策（或“垂直纳什”）博弈在线性需求曲线下变得不可行，但在等弹性需求曲线下变得相当可行和可取。
Consider a basic “price-only” supply chain interaction in which the “players” are a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer sets the wholesale price ($w/unit) of a product she supplies to a retailer, who in turn sets the retail price ($p/unit) at which he sells to the consumers. The product's demand curve is a function of p. The players select to play one of several non-cooperative games such as the manufacturer-Stackelberg game. How should the players set their prices w and p? Most existing studies assume information symmetry i.e., the cost and market parameters are known equally and perfectly to both players. In reality, the retailer's knowledge of the manufacturing cost c is often controlled by the manufacturer. This paper considers explicitly the asymmetry of knowledge in c. This approach reveals interesting and surprising deviations from earlier symmetrical-c-knowledge results. Moreover, the approach also ameliorates some of the internal inconsistencies within the symmetric-information framework. We also show how the effect of knowledge asymmetry varies with the shape of the demand curve and with the degree of relative dominance between the players. We find that under a linear demand curve a manufacturer should overstate c, which is an intuitively expected result. However, under an iso-elastic demand curve she benefits herself and the entire system by understating c, which is counter-intuitive. Also, under asymmetric c-knowledge, the simultaneous decision (or “vertical Nash”) game becomes non-viable under a linear demand curve, but the game becomes quite viable and desirable under an iso-elastic demand curve.