THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION
THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION
复制标题
DOI：
10.1126/science.7466396
复制
发表时间：
1981-01-01
期刊：
影响因子：
56.9
通讯作者：
HAMILTON, WD
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
AXELROD, R;HAMILTON, WD
自达尔文以来，无论是细菌还是灵长类，生物体之间的合作一直是进化论的一个难题。假设成对个体之间的相互作用发生在概率的基础上，一个模型的基础上的概念的进化稳定策略的囚徒困境游戏的背景下。从模型中推导出的结果，以及计算机比赛的结果，显示了基于互惠的合作如何在一个反社会的世界中开始，如何在与各种其他策略互动的同时蓬勃发展，以及如何在完全建立后抵御入侵。潜在的应用包括领土，交配和疾病的具体方面。
Cooperation in organisms, whether bacteria or primates, has been a difficulty for evolutionary theory since Darwin. On the assumption that interactions between pairs of individuals occur on a probabilistic basis, a model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner''s Dilemma game. Deductions from the model, and the results of a computer tournament, show how cooperation based on reciprocity can start in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies and can resist invasion once fully established. Potential applications include specific aspects of territoriality, mating and disease.