The Liability Maze the Impact of Liability Law on Safety and Innovation Liability, Innovation, and Safety in the Chemical Industry
The Liability Maze the Impact of Liability Law on Safety and Innovation Liability, Innovation, and Safety in the Chemical Industry
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责任迷宫 责任法对安全和创新的影响 化工行业的责任、创新和安全
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通讯作者：
R. F. Stone
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作者：
Peter W. Huber;R. Litan;N. Ash́ford;R. F. Stone
CH EMICAL products have assumed a steadily increasing role in the U.S. economy throughout this century, contributing to the improvements in the standard of living and the levels of health and safety that America enjoys. At the same time, the fact that the production and use of some chemicals create hazards in the workplace, at home, and in the environment has caused intensified public and private awareness and concern. One mechanism for addressing chemical hazards in this country is tort liability, which permits private parties who sustain chemical injury to seek recovery for damages from the firm responsible. The purpose of this chapter is to assess the effects of liability for chemical harm, as deployed under the prevailing tort system. In broadest terms, the appropriate measure of the effects is whether liability provides, in some meaningful sense, a net social benefit. For the analysis here, three questions that are related both in theory and in practice need to be considered. Does tort liability for chemical harm promote safety and health? Does tort liability for chemical harm stimulate or inhibit innovation? In trying to control chemical hazards and foster technological advance, does tort liability for chemical harm impose an unacceptably high cost on consumers and industry? (That is, does tort liability for chemical harm result in overdeterrence of chemical risks? Or conversely, are chemical hazards underdeterred by tort liability?) In this chapter we analyze economic costs and other incentives arising from tort liability that serve to reduce chemical hazards. Our analysis of incentives is performed in the context of innovation theory, which we examine in some detail. To assess whether the safety incentives resulting from liability are excessive or inadequate, we develop an optimal deter-rence benchmark, reflecting the total social costs of chemical harm, and j67
