The supply side of United Nations peacekeeping operations: Trade ties and United Nations-led deployments to civil war states
The supply side of United Nations peacekeeping operations: Trade ties and United Nations-led deployments to civil war states
复制标题
联合国维和行动的供应方：贸易关系和联合国主导的向内战国家的部署
DOI：
10.1177/1354066114532665
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发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
3.4
通讯作者：
J. Tir
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
S. Stojek;J. Tir
维持和平行动已被确定为解决内战复发这一高度棘手问题的最有效和最有效的解决办法；然而，只有大约38%的内战得到维持和平援助。为了解释是什么决定了国家内部冲突是否需要部署维和人员，我们指出，维持和平行动是需要大量物质投资的代价高昂的努力。聚焦于联合国及其维和行动，我们认为，由于相对较少的国家决定可能的部署(和资金)，联合国维和行动的供应可能反映了这些国家的利益。具体地说，我们假设，安全理事会五个常任理事国与内战国家之间的贸易关系是影响授权联合国维和行动决定的因素之一。对第二次世界大战后和冷战后时期的争论表明，安全理事会五个常任理事国的经济利益在解释哪些内战接收联合国维和人员方面发挥了关键作用。
Peacekeeping operations have been identified as the most effective and efficient solution to the highly intractable problem of civil war recurrence; yet, only about 38% of civil wars receive peacekeeping assistance. To explain what determines whether an intrastate conflict receives a deployment of peacekeepers, we note that peacekeeping operations are costly endeavors requiring significant material investments. Focusing on the United Nations and its peacekeeping operations, we argue that because a relatively small group of states decides about (and funds) possible deployments, the supply of United Nations peacekeeping operations likely reflects the interests of these states. Specifically, we hypothesize that trade ties between the five permanent members of the Security Council and civil war states are among the factors that influence the decision to authorize United Nations peacekeeping operations. Testing the argument over the post-World War II and post-Cold War periods reveals that the economic interests of the permanent five members of the Security Council play a key role in explaining which civil wars receive United Nations peacekeepers.