Procurement under public scrutiny: auctions versus negotiations
Procurement under public scrutiny: auctions versus negotiations
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DOI：
10.1111/1756-2171.12159
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发表时间：
2016-11
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Vitali Gretschko;A. Wambach
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Vitali Gretschko;A. Wambach
我们比较了公共采购中两种常用的机制：拍卖和谈判。采购机制的执行被委托给买方的代理人。代理商拥有关于买方偏好的私人信息，并可能与其中一个卖方勾结。我们提供了一个一般的表征，这两种机制的基础上，公众监督的要求和显示，与传统的智慧，一个不透明的谈判总是产生更高的社会盈余比透明的拍卖。此外，存在一个下限的卖方的数量，使得谈判也产生了更高的买方盈余。
We compare two commonly used mechanisms in public procurement: auctions and negotiations. The execution of the procurement mechanism is delegated to an agent of the buyer. The agent has private information about the buyer's preferences and may collude with one of the sellers. We provide a general characterization of both mechanisms based on public scrutiny requirements and show—contrary to conventional wisdom—that an intransparent negotiation always yields higher social surplus than a transparent auction. Moreover, there exists a lower bound on the number of sellers such that the negotiation also generates a higher buyer surplus.