Disowning Fukushima: Managing the credibility of nuclear reliability assessment in the wake of disaster
Disowning Fukushima: Managing the credibility of nuclear reliability assessment in the wake of disaster
复制标题
否认福岛：灾难发生后管理核可靠性评估的可信度
DOI：
10.1111/rego.12029
复制
发表时间：
2013
影响因子：
3
通讯作者：
John Downer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
John Downer
本文反思了2011年福岛核泄漏后核风险评估的可信度。在民主国家，围绕核能的政策制定长期以来一直基于这样一种理解，即专家可以客观准确地计算灾难性事故的概率。然而，福岛核灾难证明，大量社会科学研究表明，这种计算从根本上是行不通的。然而，这些评估的可信度似乎在灾难中幸存下来，就像它抵制了以前核事故的证据一样。本文探讨了其中的原因。报告认为，公众对福岛灾难的描述总是以一种让风险评估专家“否认”的方式来描述这场灾难。报告的结论是，尽管这些描述既具有说服力，又对核电治理产生了重大影响，但它们并不完全可信。
This paper reflects on the credibility of nuclear risk assessment in the wake of the 2011 Fukushima meltdowns. In democratic states, policymaking around nuclear energy has long been premised on an understanding that experts can objectively and accurately calculate the probability of catastrophic accidents. Yet the Fukushima disaster lends credence to the substantial body of social science research that suggests such calculations are fundamentally unworkable. Nevertheless, the credibility of these assessments appears to have survived the disaster, just as it has resisted the evidence of previous nuclear accidents. This paper looks at why. It argues that public narratives of the Fukushima disaster invariably frame it in ways that allow risk-assessment experts to “disown” it. It concludes that although these narratives are both rhetorically compelling and highly consequential to the governance of nuclear power, they are not entirely credible.