Linear–quadratic stochastic two-person nonzero-sum differential games: Open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria
Linear–quadratic stochastic two-person nonzero-sum differential games: Open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria
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DOI:
10.1016/j.spa.2018.03.002
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发表时间:
2016-07
影响因子:
1.4
通讯作者:
Jingrui Sun;J. Yong
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Jingrui Sun;J. Yong
In this paper, we consider a linear–quadratic stochastic two-person nonzero-sum differential game. Open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria are introduced. The existence of the former is characterized by the solvability of a system of forward–backward stochastic differential equations, and that of the latter is characterized by the solvability of a system of coupled symmetric Riccati differential equations. Sometimes, open-loop Nash equilibria admit a closed-loop representation, via the solution to a system of non-symmetric Riccati equations, which could be different from the outcome of the closed-loop Nash equilibria in general. However, it is found that for the case of zero-sum differential games, the Riccati equation system for the closed-loop representation of an open-loop saddle point coincides with that for the closed-loop saddle point, which leads to the conclusion that the closed-loop representation of an open-loop saddle point is the outcome of the corresponding closed-loop saddle point as long as both exist. In particular, for linear–quadratic optimal control problem, the closed-loop representation of an open-loop optimal control coincides with the outcome of the corresponding closed-loop optimal strategy, provided both exist.