One or two: An examination of the recent case of the conjoined twins from Malta
One or two: An examination of the recent case of the conjoined twins from Malta
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DOI：
10.1076/jmep.28.1.27.14176
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发表时间：
2003-02-01
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
Barilan, YM
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Barilan, YM
本文质疑连体双胞胎必然是两个人或人的假设，并采用基于不同观点的论点：非个人活力论，作为有知觉的人，作为代理人的人，作为叙述和评价的场所的人，以及作为体现心灵的人。从截肢、多重人格障碍、堕胎、裂脑病人和克隆的案例中进行类比。这篇文章进一步质疑了连体双胞胎的自然兴趣和愿望是分离的假设。我首先认为，分离是一个如此激进的程序，以至于使分离后的人不同于分离前的人。因此，不可能通过分离行为使分离前的双胞胎受益。文章最后对生物伦理学中把伦理挑战视为个人之间争夺稀缺资源的竞争的倾向进行了批判性的评价。
The article questions the assumption that conjoined twins are necessarily two people or persons by employing arguments based on different points of view: non-personal vitalism, the person as a sentient being, the person as an agent, the person as a locus of narrative and valuation, and the person as an embodied mind. Analogies employed from the cases of amputation, multiple personality disorder, abortion, split-brain patients and cloning. The article further questions the assumption that a conjoined twin's natural interest and wish is separation. I first contend that separation is such a radical procedure as to render the post-separation person different from the pre-separation one. Therefore, it is not possible to benefit the pre-separation twin by the act of separation. The article concludes with a critical evaluation of the tendency in bioethics to regard ethical challenges as rivalry between individuals competing for scarce resources.