Some theoretic characteristics of economic and political coalitions
Some theoretic characteristics of economic and political coalitions
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经济和政治联盟的一些理论特征
DOI：
10.1177/002200276701100205
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发表时间：
1967
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Cross
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Cross
本文试图利用经济学理论中常见的几个假设，对政治互动理论中的一个重要问题--联盟的形成--作一些探讨。有人认为，约束市场行为的同一竞争过程，在现实中，同样重要的作用，在联盟的决定，并认为寻找一个“最佳”联盟是没有什么不同的原则，从寻找最低价格。只要满足两个基本前提，分析结果将被发现适用于各种各样的联盟情况：（1）联盟mcmbr的动机是希望最大化其成员资格的价值（对自己），l和（2）在一个集团中的成员资格排除了在另一个集团中的成员资格，即，在替代品中的选择必须是一个主导问题。
This paper represents an attempt to make use of a few postulates which are frequently found in cconomic theory, and to achieve thereby some insights into an important problem in the theory of political interactions-the formation of coalitions. It is suggested that the same competitive process which constrains market behavior has, in reality, an equally important role in the determination of alliances, and that the search for a “best” alliance is no different in principle from the search for a lowest price. The resulting analysis will be found to apply to a wide variety of alliance situations provided that two fundamental premises are satisfied: (1) alliance mcmbcrs are motivated by a desire to maximize the value (to themselves) of their membership,l and ( 2 ) membership in one grouping precludes membership in another, that is, choice among alternatives must be a dominant problem.?